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to a Voluntary Price Premium
Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of conservation behavior that
is motivated by concern for the environment. Two types of behavior are considered. First,
individuals who care about environmental quality may voluntarily restrain their consumption
of goods and services that generate a negative externality. Second, individuals may choose
to pay a voluntary price premium for goods and services that are more ￿environmentally
friendly.￿ A theoretical model highlights the relationship between such voluntary restraint
and a voluntary price premium. We test predictions of the model in an empirical study of
household electricity consumption with introduction of a price-premium, green-electricity
program. We ￿nd evidence of voluntary restraint and its relation to a voluntary price
premium. The empirical results are consistent with the model of conservation behavior,
as none of the theoretical predictions can be rejected.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: D1, Q4, Q5.And I￿ m asking you for your good and for your Nation￿ s security to take no
unnecessary trips, to use carpools or public transportation whenever you can, to
park your car one extra day per week, to obey the speed limit, and to set your
thermostats to save fuel. Every act of energy conservation like this is more than
just common sense￿ I tell you it is an act of patriotism.
￿ U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 1979
Conservation may be a sign of personal virtue, but it is not a su¢ cient basis for
a sound, comprehensive energy policy.
￿ U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney, 2001
1 Introduction
Political leaders debate whether conservation can play a meaningful role in national energy
policy. Yet economists know very little about conservation itself. Without price incentives or
government regulation, do people actually exhibit voluntary conservation? If so, under what
circumstances? To what extent? And why? This paper provides a theoretical and empirical
investigation of conservation behavior that is motivated by concern for the environment. The
primary focus of environmental economics over the last three decades has been the design
of policy instruments that induce agents to internalize their environmental externalities.
Our approach here is di⁄erent: we examine the extent to which consumers internalize their
externalities voluntarily￿ through conservation that arises without policy interventions.
We develop a theoretical model of consumer behavior to explain the relationship between
two potential types of voluntary conservation. The ￿rst is that consumers who care about
environmental quality may demand less of a good that causes a negative externality. The
second is that consumers may choose to pay a premium for goods and services that are more
￿environmentally friendly.￿ We refer to these two behaviors as voluntary restraint and a
voluntary price premium, respectively. After developing the model, we test its predictions in
an empirical study of household demand for electricity in Traverse City, Michigan. The study
period spans the date when the public utility initiated a voluntary green-electricity program
1to reduce air pollution emissions.1 To participate in the program, households must agree
to pay a price premium of 25 percent (on average) for their electricity consumption. The
revenues from the premium are then used to ￿nance a centralized wind turbine that displaces
generation at the local coal-￿red power plant. This empirical setting￿ which includes panel
data on electricity consumption that we combine with an original household survey￿ provides
a unique opportunity to investigate conservation behavior as it relates to voluntary restraint
of conventional electricity and to a voluntary price premium for green electricity.
Prior economic research has investigated various empirical aspects of voluntary restraint
in the context of energy consumption. A few studies have analyzed whether appeals for
conservation following the energy crisis of 1973 had an e⁄ect on household energy use. Peck
and Doering (1976) study household demand for heating fuel and ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect
of a conservation campaign aimed at changing residential fuel-use patterns. Other studies
￿nd di⁄erent results. Walker (1980) reviews several of these studies and provides evidence in
support of the hypothesis that the energy crisis stimulated conservation beyond that which
can be explained by changes in price or income. Estimates of this conservation e⁄ect range
from 4 percent for electricity to 10 percent for natural gas. Lee (1981) ￿nds a similar result,
with estimates ranging from 1 to 4 percent, for voluntary conservation of electricity due to
a public relations campaign in the Central Valley of California during the mid-1970s.
Another line of research investigates voluntary participation in utility-sponsored conser-
vation programs, such as energy audits, rebates, and time-of-use rates (e.g., Train, McFad-
den, and Goett, 1987; Hartman, 1988; Waldman and Ozog, 1996; and Baladi, Herriges, and
Sweeney, 1998). While the primary incentive for enrolling in such programs is cost sav-
ings, attitudes about natural resources and conservation play a signi￿cant role in explaining
household participation (Train, McFadden, and Goett, 1987).
A recent empirical literature also investigates willingness to pay a voluntary price pre-
mium for green electricity. Many of these studies employ stated- or revealed-preference
techniques to derive estimates of willingness to pay for various types of green electricity
1￿Green￿electricity is electricity generated from renewable sources of energy, including wind, solar, and
geothermal energy. Most conventional electricity in the United States is generated from coal, which produces
several air pollutants as by-products (e.g., CO, CO2, NOx, SO2, particulates, lead, and mercury).
2(e.g., Goett, Hudson, and Train, 2000; Champ and Bishop, 2001; and Roe, et al., 2001).
Other studies analyze factors that in￿ uence participation in a particular green-electricity
program (e.g., Oberholzer-Gee, 2001; Rose, et al., 2002; and Clark, Kotchen, and Moore,
2003). In general, this literature ￿nds that many households state a willingness to pay a
premium for green electricity, yet actual participation in a green-electricity program depends
on program structure, household characteristics, attitudes related to the environment, and
the existence of ￿warm-glow￿motives for participation.2
This paper makes several contributions. The theoretical model is the ￿rst to examine
the relationship between voluntary restraint and a voluntary price premium. The model
draws on insights from psychology research on altruism and economic research on motives
for private provision of public goods. Although very simple, the model generates a series of
new predictions that relate conservation based on quantities to conservation based on prices.
The empirical setting of electricity consumption with introduction of a green-electricity pro-
gram is ideal for testing these predictions. The data come from the combination of an
original household survey and eight years of monthly panel data on household electricity
consumption. An advantage of the data is its basis in revealed preferences rather than
stated preferences. Furthermore, the paper goes beyond identifying di⁄erences between par-
ticipants and nonparticipants in a green-electricity program; for the ￿rst time, questions are
addressed about di⁄erences in behavior before and after participation. Finally, the analysis
takes advantage of a natural experiment in which program participants are compared with
a control group of households on the program￿ s waiting list.
The empirical results provide evidence of voluntary restraint and its relation to a volun-
tary price premium. Households identi￿ed as conservationists (through membership in an
environmental organization) consume approximately 10 percent less conventional electric-
ity than nonconservationists. Conservationist households are also more likely to participate
in the green-electricity program. Interestingly, upon participation in the green-electricity
program, di⁄erences in electricity demand between conservationists and nonconservationists
2A ￿warm-glow￿motive captures the idea that households may participate in a green-electricity program
because it makes them feel good about ￿doing their part￿ to protect the environment. This motive is a
private bene￿t that is distinct from any public bene￿t that may arise from reduced pollution (see Andreoni,
1989, 1990).
3are no longer apparent. This occurs because the price premium for green electricity does
not change consumption for conservationists, but it does change consumption for noncon-
servationists. The fact that participating conservationists do not change their electricity
consumption suggests that the price premium for green electricity is approximately equal to
the subjective externality that they were voluntarily internalizing with conventional electric-
ity.
As for participating nonconservationists, we ￿nd a reduction in consumption as if there
had been an increase in the price of conventional electricity equal to the premium for green
electricity. This reduction is used to show that willingness to pay a voluntary premium for
green electricity is motivated, in part, by a lump-sum bene￿t that is unrelated to electricity
consumption. Possible explanations include psychological and social bene￿ts related to social
approval, prestige, and warm-glow satisfaction. We show that these results and others are
consistent with the model of conservation behavior, as none of the theoretical predictions
can be rejected by the empirical analysis.
2 A Simple Model
The extensive psychology literature on conservation behavior provides the starting point for
the economic model developed here. Much of this literature is based on the model developed
by Schwartz (1970, 1977) concerning the activation of norms for altruistic behavior. In
general, these norms consist of the personal obligation to act in ways that prevent harm
to others or that promote the welfare of others, even if it entails personal cost. Activation
of these norms, however, depends critically on the presence of two beliefs: awareness that
harmful consequences may come to others from inaction, and ascription of responsibility to
oneself for those consequences. According to the model, individuals who possess these beliefs
consider it their duty to behave altruistically; otherwise they experience a feeling of guilt
from shirking their responsibility.
Psychologists have used the Schwartz model to investigate conservation behavior as it
relates to electricity consumption (e.g., Black, Stern and Elworth, 1985). In this context,
the necessary beliefs to motivate conservation are interpreted as awareness of pollution that
4arises from generating conventional electricity, and ascription of personal responsibility for
some of the social costs. Because studies have repeatedly documented the importance of these
beliefs for motivating household energy conservation (see Stern, 1992), the insights of the
Schwartz model provide a reasonable starting point for developing an economic perspective.
Our model is based on the simplest setup capable of illustrating the relevant issues of
voluntary conservation in the context of electricity consumption. We consider two types of
households: conservationists and nonconservationists, where only conservationists satisfy the
necessary conditions of Schwartz￿ s norm-activation model. We then consider di⁄erences in
electricity consumption between conservationists and nonconservationists, before and after
introduction of a price-premium, green-electricity program.
Assume initially that only conventional electricity is available. Households seek to max-
imize a utility function that has the following form:
U (xi;y
c





where xi is a numeraire consumption good, yc
i is conventional electricity, and ￿i is an in-
dicator variable such that ￿i = 1 if household i is a conservationist type, and ￿i = 0 if
household i is a nonconservationist type.3 The functional form assumptions are as follows:
all functions map into R1
+, all ￿rst derivatives are strictly positive, and the second derivatives
satisfy l00 ￿ 0, f00 < 0, and h00 ￿ 0. This setup implies that, relative to nonconservationists,
conservationists care about a negative aspect of their conventional-electricity consumption.
We assume this is related to pollution, which causes conservationists to experience guilt from
consuming conventional electricity. The functional form of h(yc
i) implies that conservation-
ists feel strictly guiltier (at a weakly increasing rate) when they consume more conventional
electricity.
Each household is endowed with exogenous income m, which (for simplicity) we assume
is the same for all households. Conventional electricity is available at a constant per unit
price pc.4 Assuming interior solutions (here and throughout), the ￿rst-order condition that
3Additive separability of xi and yc
i is only a simplifying assumption and does not a⁄ect any of the results.
4We ￿rst develop the model with a constant price per unit of electricity. We then show how the results
generalize to situations with increasing block-rate schedules, which are common for electricity.
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Figure 1: Voluntary restraint by conservationists
implicitly de￿nes each household￿ s demand for conventional electricity ^ yc











Figure 1 illustrates the way ^ yc
i is determined for households of di⁄erent types. For all house-
holds, f0 (yc
i) is the marginal bene￿t of consuming conventional electricity. For nonconser-
vationists, pcl0 (m ￿ pcyc
i) is the marginal cost, due to forgone consumption of the numeraire
only. The marginal cost of consuming conventional electricity for conservationists, however,
is pcl0 (m ￿ pcyc
i)+h0 (yc
i), which includes guilt as well. It follows that optimally chosen levels




The fact that ^ yc
1 < ^ yc
0 illustrates the notion of conservation behavior through voluntary
restraint: the guilt from generating pollution causes conservationists to restrain their con-
sumption of conventional electricity. We state this result in the following proposition, which
provides the ￿rst testable hypothesis of the model.
Proposition 1 Conservationist households will consume less conventional electricity than
nonconservationist households.
6Now assume green electricity becomes available. Assume that households can participate
in the green-electricity program only if they volunteer to pay a ￿xed premium of ￿ > 0
per unit of electricity consumption, for all of their electricity consumption. The price of
green electricity is therefore pg = ￿ + pc. Green electricity and conventional electricity
are perfect substitutes in all respects other than the fact that green electricity does not
generate pollution.5 As a result, conservationists have no reason to feel guilty if they consume
green electricity; that is, h(y
g
i) = 0 for any level of green electricity y
g
i. It follows that,
depending on the magnitude of ￿, conservationist households may choose to participate in
the green-electricity program in order to avoid the guilt of generating pollution through their
consumption of conventional electricity.
Other factors may also prompt households to participate in the green-electricity program.
Many programs, including the one studied in this paper, o⁄er decals for the home and car to
signal participation, along with newsletters about program and participant updates. Social
bene￿ts that are unrelated to electricity consumption may therefore motivate participation;
the range of possibilities includes social approval, prestige, and signaling about household in-
come.6 Psychological bene￿ts, which are similarly unrelated to electricity consumption, may
also play a role, as participation can be associated with the ￿purchase of moral satisfaction￿
(Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992) or a feeling of ￿warm glow￿(Andreoni, 1989, 1990).7
To capture the possibility for these social and psychological bene￿ts, we assume that,
conditional on participation, each household enjoys a lump-sum bene￿t ki ￿ 0, regardless of
whether the household is of the conservationist or nonconservationist type. Note that the
lump-sum bene￿t implies that even nonconservationists may have a reason to participate.
The decision of whether to participate in the green-electricity program depends on a
5An implicit assumption is that the green-electricity program creates new capacity, or that the level of
active capacity depends on the level of participation. This ensures that purchasing green electricity actually
displaces generation of conventional electricity, and thereby causes a reduction in pollution emissions.
6The importance of social bene￿ts of this type has been examined in the literature on private provision of
public goods. For examples, see Hollander (1990), Glazer and Konrad (1996), and Harbaugh (1998a, 1998b).
7In a study of contributions to a green-electricity program in Switzerland, Oberholzer-Gee (2001) ￿nds
empirical support for such psychological bene￿ts. He concludes that ￿The warm-glow part of the motiva-
tion to contribute appears to be independent of the value of the public good in the sense that individuals
participate in the program even if they do not believe that their use of solar energy will improve the quality
of the environment. For these individuals, it is su¢ cient that they contribute to a cause which they believe
to be important￿(p. 433).
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Figure 2: A nonconservationist￿ s consumption before and after participation
comparison of two potential levels of utility. These levels can be written as
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It follows a household will choose to participate in the green-electricity program only if
V c (pc;m;￿i) ￿ V g (pg;m;￿i). But what does participation imply about the guilt from
consumption of conventional electricity and the existence of a lump-sum bene￿t? How will
participation a⁄ect the quantity of electricity consumption? And what di⁄erences in behavior
will occur between participating conservationists and nonconservationists? We now turn to
these questions.
Consider nonconservationist households ￿rst. It is clear that nonconservationists must
enjoy a lump-sum bene￿t if they participate in the green-electricity program. This follows
because ki is the only bene￿t they enjoy from participation: unless ki is positive, non-
conservationists have no incentive to pay the price premium for green electricity. Figure
2 demonstrates this point. Demand for conventional electricity is ^ yc
0. Then, conditional
8on participation, demand for green electricity will be ^ y
g










0 > ^ y
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0, electricity consumption declines, and there is a loss in surplus equal to
the shaded area. Thus, participation requires a lump-sum bene￿t ki that is large enough to
o⁄set the loss in surplus.
A further result pertaining to nonconservationists follows from the fact that ki a⁄ects
participation, but not the marginal decision about the quantity demanded of green electricity.
A nonconservationist￿ s demand for electricity is determined by price only. This implies that
a nonconservationist￿ s behavioral response to participation in the green-electricity program
will be as if there had been an exogenous increase in the price of conventional electricity
equal to the premium ￿. To see this, simply add ￿ to pc in equation (1), and note that the
resulting level of ^ yc
i for a nonconservationist would be the same as ^ y
g
i in equation (2).
The following proposition summarizes the results for nonconservationists.
Proposition 2 If a nonconservationist household participates in the green-electricity pro-
gram, then: (a) the household must enjoy a lump-sum bene￿t from participation; and (b) after
participating, the household￿ s electricity consumption will decline by as much as it would if
there had been an increase in the price of conventional electricity equal to the premium for
green electricity.
Now consider conservationist households. It turns out that if the price of green elec-
tricity is su¢ ciently high, the necessary condition for participation is similar to that for
nonconservationists. To see this, assume ￿ is large enough so that the marginal cost curve
of consuming green electricity lies above the marginal cost curve of consuming conventional
electricity. Figure 3 provides an illustration with the price of green electricity set at ￿ pg.




1. Yet because there is a loss in surplus equal to the shaded area, participation requires
an o⁄setting lump-sum bene￿t. Thus, even conservationists may require a su¢ ciently large
lump-sum bene￿t in order to participate in the green-electricity program. In fact, it is
9straightforward to show that whenever a participating conservationist reduces electricity
consumption, it must be the case that ki > 0. This follows because the assumption that
h00 (yc
i) ￿ 0 implies that if ^ y
g
1 < ^ yc
1, there must be a loss in surplus, as the marginal cost for
conventional electricity is lower than for green electricity for all yi < ^ yc
1. Thus, to o⁄set the
loss in surplus, participation requires a su¢ ciently large ki > 0.
More generally, however, conservationists di⁄er from nonconservationists because their
electricity consumption need not fall after participating in the green-electricity program, and
participation does not require a lump-sum bene￿t. Figure 3 provides an illustration with the




1, and participation occurs even if ki = 0. This follows because there is a gain in surplus,
rather than a loss. Note that, in this case, households choose to pay a higher price for
electricity and then consume more. In order to understand this somewhat counterintuitive
possibility, the important comparison is between the marginal guilt from consumption of
conventional electricity at ^ yc
i and the increased marginal cost from the price premium of
green electricity at the same level of electricity consumption. If the former is greater than
(less than, or equal to) the latter, then electricity consumption will increase (decrease, or
remain the same).8
The following proposition summarizes the results for conservationists.
Proposition 3 If a conservationist household participates in the green-electricity program,
then: (a) the household￿ s electricity consumption can increase, decrease, or remain the same,
and (b) if consumption decreases, the household must enjoy a lump-sum bene￿t from partic-
ipation.
The model generates further predictions about similarities and di⁄erences between con-
servationists and nonconservationists that participate in the green-electricity program. We
have shown how conservationists have no incentive to voluntarily restrain their consumption
of green electricity, as it generates no pollution. Conservationists and nonconservationists
8Considering a special case makes this idea clear. Assume utility is quasilinear in xi (i.e., l0 (xi) = 1) and
marginal guilt is constant such that h0 (yc
i) = ￿. In this case, it is straightforward to show that, electricity
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Figure 3: A conservationist￿ s electricity consumption can increase or decrease
are therefore indistinguishable in terms of their demand for green electricity, which must
satisfy equation (2) regardless of the household￿ s type. Accordingly, a prediction of the
model is that all participating households in the green-electricity program will consume the
same amount of green electricity. Moreover, because only conservationists were exhibiting
voluntary restraint before participating, the model also predicts that they will reduce their
consumption by less (if at all) than nonconservationists, who will respond as if there had
been an increase in the price of conventional electricity (see Proposition 2). The following
proposition summarizes these additional results.
Proposition 4 If both conservationists and nonconservationists participate in the green-
electricity program, then: (a) households of both types will consume the same amount of
green electricity, and (b) conservationists will reduce their electricity consumption by less (if
at all) than nonconservationists.
Thus far we have assumed a constant per-unit price of electricity. Yet residential elec-
tricity pricing is often structured with an increasing block-rate schedule. The public utility
studied in the empirical portion of this paper provides such an example. So how do the
results of the model change with an increasing block-rate schedule? The answer is very lit-
tle. To see why, consider a two-tiered increasing block rate, where the price of conventional





pc for 0 ￿ yc
i ￿ y￿
p￿
c for y￿ < yc
i,
where pc < p￿
c and y￿ is the quantity threshold between rates.9 If we continue to assume
a constant premium ￿ for green electricity, it is straightforward to modify the preceding
analysis to account for the block rate. Graphically, the only di⁄erence is that all marginal
cost curves have a discontinuity at yi = y￿; they all shift up by at least p￿
c ￿ pc for yi > y￿.
After reconstructing Figures 1 through 3 with this modi￿cation, it is straightforward to see
that only two results change slightly: the voluntary restraint of Proposition 1 holds with
a weak (rather than strict) inequality, and the second part of Proposition 4 holds weakly
(rather than strictly) as well. Both of these changes occur because of the possibility that
demand is clustered at the threshold between block rates.
3 Empirical Setting and Data Collection
We test predictions of the theoretical model in an empirical study of demand for electricity,
before and after introduction of a green-electricity program in Traverse City, Michigan. The
municipal utility company, Traverse City Light and Power (TCL&P), provides electricity
service to approximately 7,000 residential households. In 1994, TCL&P began soliciting
households to voluntarily ￿nance a centralized wind turbine that would generate electricity
and replace generation at the local coal-￿red power plant. TCL&P completed construction
of the wind turbine and began operating the ￿Green Rate￿program in June 1996.10 To
participate in the program, households are required to make a three-year commitment to
purchase all of their electricity at a price premium of 1.58 cents per kilowatt-hour. After
accounting for the block-rate pricing schedule (described below), this translates into an
9Although increasing block-rate schedules often include more than two tiers, consideration of a two-tiered
schedule is su¢ cient to demonstrate the implications for the model.
10At the time of construction, the wind turbine was the largest operating in the United States. It pro-
duces about 800,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity per year, which can meet the needs of approximately 125
households.
12average residential premium of $8.50 per month, or a 25-percent increase in the average
household￿ s electricity bill.
This section describes the data we use for the empirical analysis. The data come from
the combination of an original household survey of TCL&P customers (including Green
Rate participants, nonparticipants, and those on the program￿ s waitlist), and monthly panel
data on electricity consumption between 1994 and 2002. In this section we also describe
the empirical strategy of using membership in an environmental organization to distinguish
between conservationists and nonconservationists.
3.1 Survey Data
We developed and administered a mail survey of TCL&P residential customers. The survey
was designed to collect data on socioeconomic characteristics, physical attributes of each
residence, and household behaviors related to conservation. All households received the
same version of the survey instrument.11 The survey was conducted in 2001 using the
Dillman (1978) Total Design Method. A total sample of 1,000 households included those
that were (at the time of the survey) participants in the Green Rate program, on the waitlist,
or nonparticipants. Speci￿cally, the sample was strati￿ed to include all 122 households that
were participants, all 32 households that were on the waitlist, and a random sample of 846
households that were nonparticipants with utility records dating back to 1994. TCL&P
provided the names and mailing addresses. After accounting for undeliverable addresses, the
overall response rate for the survey was 70 percent (106 participants, 27 waitlisters, and 544
nonparticipants), which is relatively high.
The existence of a waitlist for the Green Rate program is an important feature of the data
because it creates a natural experiment in which to analyze the e⁄ect of a voluntary price
premium. Households choose whether or not to participate in the program, but they have
no control over whether they are placed on the waitlist. From the beginning, the program
was oversubscribed relative to the wind turbine￿ s capacity, so the waitlist was created at
the outset. Since that time, households have been removed from the waitlist to become
11Copies of the survey instrument are available from the authors upon request.
13Table 1: Summary statistics for participants, nonparticipants, and waitlisters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Particip. Waitlist Nonparticip. t stat. t stat. t stat.
N=106 N=27 N=544 (1) vs (2) (1) vs (3) (2) vs (3)
Income 66.064 68.462 56.949 0.303 2.302￿￿ 1.663￿
(37.163) (29.488) (34.611)
FamSize 2.340 2.154 2.233 0.749 0.766 0.305
(1.193) (0.834) (1.310)
Own (1=yes) 0.961 1.000 0.915 1.017 1.606 1.552
House (1=yes) 0.876 0.923 0.867 0.668 0.243 0.823
AptCondo (1=yes) 0.105 0.077 0.104 0.422 0.018 0.446
MobHome (1=yes) 0.019 0.000 0.028 0.705 0.541 0.870
Age 56.324 55.462 60.504 0.287 2.618￿￿￿ 1.698￿
(13.976) (12.465) (14.874)
Gender (1=male) 0.500 0.577 0.525 0.697 0.462 0.517
Education 16.349 16.444 14.528 0.149 6.028￿￿￿ 3.467￿￿￿
(3.01) (2.778) (2.802)
EnvtOrg (1=yes) 0.471 0.444 0.158 0.240 7.367￿￿￿ 2.883￿￿￿
kWhDay 16.105 16.439 17.950 0.214 1.806￿ 0.572
(6.847) (8.258) (10.070)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses and reported for continuous variables only. The
number of observations for each statistic varies somewhat due to item nonresponse. Income is
household pre-tax income in year 2000 measured in 1000s of dollars. FamSize indicates the num-
ber of family members living in the household. Own indicates ownership. House, AptCondo,
and MobHome indicate house, apartment/condominium, or mobile home. Age, Gender, and
years of Education correspond to the respondent. EnvtOrg indicates membership in an environ-
mental organization. kWhDay is average daily electricity consumption by month, measured in
kilowatt-hours. One, two, or three asterisks indicate signi￿cance at the levels p<0.10, p<0.05,
or p<0.01, respectively.
14participants only when another household withdrew from the Green Rate program. With
respect to participants and waitlisters, therefore, actual participation is virtually random.
We take advantage of this exogeneity in the empirical analysis, where comparisons between
participants and waitlisters provide a natural experiment in which to analyze the e⁄ect of a
voluntary price premium.
At this point, we compare descriptive statistics for the key survey variables among par-
ticipants, waitlisters, and nonparticipants. These statistics are reported in the ￿rst three
columns of Table 1, while the latter columns report the pairwise t-test statistics. A com-
parison of the three groups reveals two patterns. As one might expect given the discussion
above, there are no signi￿cant di⁄erences between participants and waitlisters. Nonpartici-
pants, however, di⁄er from participants and waitlisters with respect to several variables. On
average, nonparticipants have an annual household income that is about $10,000 lower, are
four years older, have two fewer years of education, and are 30 percent less likely to be a
self-reported member of an environmental organization.12
3.2 Utility Data
TCL&P began keeping electronic records of household billing cycles in 1994. Data on elec-
tricity consumption for each billing cycle were obtained from January 1994 through May
2002, for a total of 101 months. From these data, we calculated average daily electricity
consumption by month for each household in the survey sample.13 The last row of Table
1 reports descriptive statistics for this variable (kWhDay) for participants, waitlisters, and
nonparticipants. While the means for all three groups fall between 16 and 18 kilowatt-hours
per day (kWh/day), nonparticipants consume signi￿cantly more electricity than participants.
This di⁄erence is 1.85 kWh/day, or just over 10 percent.
The TCL&P data also includes monthly information on residential rate schedules for
12Surveys were addressed speci￿cally to the household member whose name appeared on monthly billing
statements for electricity. The fact that Traverse City is somewhat of a retirement community is re￿ ected
in the relatively high mean age.
13Characterizing electricity consumption in this way accounts for the di⁄erent number of billing days
within billing cycles.
15each household. The basic residential rate is an increasing block-rate schedule.14 Four
adjustments to this basic rate are then possible. The senior citizen rate (Senior) charges
block rates that start lower and end higher.15 The electric water heating service (WtrHeat)
allots households an additional 13 kWh/day at the lowest rate of their rate class. Electric
space heating service (SpcHeat) charges households only the lowest rate of their rate class
on all electricity consumption for the billing months of November through May.16 Finally,
as described previously, the Green Rate (GrnRate) charges an additional 1.58c //kWh for all
electricity consumption. The Green Rate became available starting in June 1996. All other
rate schedules remained constant throughout the study period.
3.3 Distinguishing Conservationists and Nonconservationists
Testing predictions of the theoretical model requires distinguishing between conservation-
ists and nonconservationists. While identifying underlying preferences poses an inherent
empirical challenge, we use self-reported membership in an environmental organization to
identify conservationists. One advantage of this strategy is its consistency with the psycho-
logical basis of the model. Recall the underlying distinction between conservationists and
nonconservationists: only conservationists are aware of environmental problems that arise
through generation of conventional electricity and are willing to take personal responsibility
for addressing the problems. While membership in an environmental organization is likely
to apply to environmental concerns more generally, it is a reasonable indicator of knowledge
about environmental problems and willingness to take personal responsibility.
But how is membership in an environmental organization related to speci￿c preferences
about conservation of electricity? Part of the survey was designed to answer this question,
and the responses provide a test of whether using membership in an environmental organiza-
tion is reasonable for identifying conservationists. Table 2 compares the responses between
those with and without membership. These comparisons are based on weighted analyses to
14This rate charges 6.33c //kWh for the ￿rst 16 kWh/day, 7.31c //kWh for the next 17 kWh/day, and
8.2c //kWh for all consumption over 33 kWh/day.
15This option charges increasing block rates of 5.3c /, 8.3c /, and 9.3c /.
16The sample percentages to which these rate adjustments apply are as follows: 23.7 percent for Senior,
7.3 percent for WtrHeat, and 1.6 percent for SpcHeat.
16Table 2: Comparison of responses between conservationists and nonconservationists
Conservationists Nonconservationists
(EnvtOrg = 1) (EnvtOrg = 0)
Survey Question N=141 N=502
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. t stat.
If you could choose among electric companies,
which of the following characteristics of a company
would be important to your decision?a
Electricity rates 0.940 0.024 0.922 0.013 0.677
Reliability of electric service 0.918 0.029 0.865 0.016 1.587
Environmental impacts of electricity production 0.951 0.024 0.563 0.024 11.516￿￿￿
Customer service 0.790 0.044 0.717 0.022 1.488
Community involvement of company 0.449 0.053 0.313 0.022 2.344￿￿
When considering the purchase of a major appliance,
how important to you is energy e¢ ciency compared
to price?b 3.304 0.079 3.138 0.035 1.931￿
Which of the following energy-saving activities does
your household engage in?a
Regularly turn o⁄ lights in unused rooms 0.937 0.025 0.962 0.009 0.929
Keep thermostat at a low temperature in winter 0.792 0.043 0.702 0.022 1.876￿
Conserve on air conditioning in summer 0.456 0.052 0.381 0.023 1.311
Reduce temperature setting on water heater 0.580 0.052 0.387 0.023 3.395￿￿￿
Add insulation in home 0.666 0.049 0.521 0.024 2.635￿￿￿
Install energy-saving lights 0.461 0.052 0.247 0.021 3.806￿￿￿
How much electricity do you think your household
uses compared to other households of similar size
and characteristics?b 2.474 0.090 2.674 0.038 -2.042￿￿￿
Notes: Statistics are based on weighted responses to correct for strati￿ed sampling. Number of observations
for each statistic varies somewhat due to item nonresponse. aResponses for each item are coded as 1=yes
and 0=no. bResponses are based on a Likert scale ranging from 1=much less to 5=much more. One, two,
or three asterisks indicate signi￿cance at the levels p<0.10, p<0.05, or p<0.01, respectively.
17account for oversampling of participants and waitlisters in the Green Rate program. The
￿rst set of questions listed in the table ask about what company characteristics would be im-
portant to consider if given the opportunity to choose between di⁄erent electric companies.
While the responses of members and nonmembers do not di⁄er signi￿cantly with respect to
electricity rates, reliability, and customer service, the responses do di⁄er signi￿cantly with
respect to the environmental impacts of electricity production and community involvement
of the company, with members caring more about both. Responses to the second question
indicate that members place signi￿cantly more importance on energy e¢ ciency compared to
price when purchasing a major appliance. Responses to the third set of questions indicate
that members also engage in more energy-saving activities, which range from temperature
settings to capital investments. Finally, responses to the last question indicate that members
perceive their own household to use less electricity than other households of similar size and
characteristics. Note that this last result corresponds directly with the notion of voluntary
restraint, which we test formally in the next section.
We also compared responses to these same questions within the samples of only par-
ticipants or nonparticipants. This approach controls for participation in the Green Rate
program and allows us to isolate di⁄erences that are due to membership in an environ-
mental organization. The results for both participants and nonparticipants follow the same
pattern as those in Table 2, so we do not report them separately. These results provide
further evidence that the classi￿cation as either conservationist or nonconservationsist is
distinct from participant or nonparticipant. That is, ￿participating nonconservationists￿are
not misidenti￿ed conservationists, and ￿nonparticipating conservationists￿are not misiden-
ti￿ed nonconservationists.
In sum, the di⁄erences in responses between members and nonmembers of an environ-
mental organization provide support for using membership as a proxy variable to distinguish
between conservationists and nonconservationists with respect to electricity consumption.
With this result, we can begin testing the theoretical predictions of the model. Interestingly,
part of the analysis evaluates whether the statements summarized in Table 2 translate into
behaviors that actually a⁄ect electricity consumption.
184 Econometric Speci￿cation and Estimation
The predictions of the theoretical model relate to di⁄erences in electricity consumption along
two dimensions: between conservationists and nonconservationists, and before and after
participation in the Green Rate program. We test these predictions using our survey and
utility data. In this section we specify the empirical models and describe our estimation
strategies.
We employ a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences methodology and estimate regression models of the
general form
kWhDayit = ’EnvtOrgi + ￿GrnRateit + ￿EnvtOrgi ￿ GrnRateit
+Xit￿ + ￿t + ￿i + "it, (3)
where i indexes households, t indexes time periods, GrnRateit is a dummy variable that
equals 1 when the household is participating in the Green Rate program and 0 otherwise,
and Xit is a row vector of other explanatory variables (including income, the other rate-class
schedules, and household characteristics).
The key parameters for testing the theoretical propositions in Section 2 are ’, ￿, and ￿,
which are interpreted as follows: ’ estimates the average di⁄erence in conventional-electricity
consumption between conservationists and nonconservationists; ￿ estimates nonconserva-
tionists￿average change in electricity consumption after participating in the green-electricity
program; and ￿ estimates the average di⁄erence between conservationists￿and nonconser-
vationists￿change in electricity consumption after participating in the green-electricity pro-
gram. Two linear combinations of these parameters are also of interest: ￿ + ￿ estimates
conservationists￿average change in electricity consumption after participating in the green-
electricity program; and ’+￿ estimates the average di⁄erence in green-electricity consump-
tion between participating conservationists and participating nonconservationists.
The coe¢ cients in equation (3) are estimated several ways. First we use a random e⁄ects
model that includes all of the observations (participants, waitlisters, and nonparticipants).
The primary advantage of the random e⁄ects model is that it enables identi￿cation of the
19coe¢ cient on EnvtOrgi, which is a time-invariant variable. This is not possible with the
alternative of a ￿xed e⁄ects model. Yet, to ensure consistency of the random e⁄ects esti-
mator, we need to assume that the unobserved e⁄ect vi is uncorrelated with the observed
explanatory variables (see Wooldridge, 2002). To test whether this assumption is reasonable,
we also estimate a ￿xed e⁄ects model using the same observations and compare its results
to those of the random e⁄ects model.
The random e⁄ects estimates are reported as the Full Sample model in Table 3. We
regress average daily electricity consumption on the variables listed in equation (3) along
with other variables that are hypothesized to in￿ uence household electricity consumption.
The other variables are the following: household income; dummy variables for the additional
rate-class schedules (Senior, WtrHeat, SpcHeat); the variables listed in Table 1 that relate
to sociodemographic characteristics and the physical attributes of each residence; and dummy
variables to control for di⁄erent months and years (not reported). The ￿xed e⁄ects estimates
are reported as the Full Sample model in the Appendix.17
We report two sets of standard errors for all of the econometric models. A recent paper by
Bertrand, Du￿ o, and Mullainathan (2004) demonstrates how failure to account for potential
serial correlation in di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimation results in underestimates of the true
standard errors. Here we follow their recommended solution by estimating standard errors
based on block bootstraps, where we draw 200 bootstrap samples and also account for
strati￿ed sampling among nonparticipants, participants, and waitlisters. To see the e⁄ect
of this correction, we report both the conventional and block bootstrap standard errors for
all models. As expected, accounting for serial correlation generally increases the standard
errors, yet the e⁄ect is not large enough to change our main conclusions with respect to
hypothesis tests.
A potential concern with the Full Sample models relates to possible endogeneity of
GrnRateit. Because participation in the Green Rate program requires households to pay
a premium on all of their electricity consumption, it is possible that electricity consumption
17All time invariant variables are dropped from the ￿xed e⁄ects model because their coe¢ cients cannot
be identi￿ed. The similarity of estimable parameters￿ especially ^ ￿ and ^ ￿￿ suggest that the additional
assumption about vi in the random e⁄ects model is not restrictive. Moreover, a Hausman test of comparing
both sets of estimates fails to reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients are the same in both models.
20could a⁄ect GrnRateit, whereby low consumption households are more likely to participate
and thus face the price premium. We address this concern in two ways. First, we simply ar-
gue that endogeneity should not be a problem. Our reasoning is that the econometric model
controls for observable characteristics that are thought to a⁄ect household electricity con-
sumption, and we control for unobservable heterogeneity with vi. Thus, endogeneity would
only arise to the extent that participation decisions for the Green Rate program are based
on a household￿ s anticipated changes in electricity consumption. While this is possible, our
opinion is that the e⁄ect of such anticipated changes is likely to be small or nonexistent.
The second way we address the concern about possible endogeneity is to estimate models
using subsets of the observations and to compare the results with those for the Full Sample
models. One speci￿cation is identical to equation (3), but includes only the participants
and waitlisters; that is, nonparticipants are excluded from the estimation. As described
previously, participants and waitlisters provide a natural experiment in which to test the
e⁄ect of GrnRateit. This follows because all households in both groups decided to participate,
but actual participation was determined exogenously. With this subset of observations, we
can identify all of the parameters with the exception of SpcHeat, which does not apply to any
of the households. The results of the random e⁄ects estimator are reported as the Natural
Experiment model in Table 3, and the results of the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator are reported in
the Appendix.18
Another model that we estimate considers only time periods prior to establishment of the
Green Rate program. This includes all observations between January 1994 and July 1996 for
all three groups (participants, waitlisters, and nonparticipants). With this subset of data, we
can ignore the Green Rate program entirely and focus on estimating the extent of voluntary
restraint, albeit over a shorter duration of time. The general form of the speci￿cation is
kWhDayit = ’EnvtOrgi + Xit￿ + ￿t + ￿i + "it, (4)
which di⁄ers from equation (3) because ￿ = ￿ = 0. The random e⁄ects and ￿xed e⁄ects
18As with the Full Sample models, we fail to reject the null hypothesis with a Hausman test, and the
estimated coe¢ cients on GrnRateit and EnvtOrgi ￿ GrnRateit are very similar between the two models.
21estimates of equation (4) are reported as the Before Program models, in Table 3 and the
Appendix, respectively.19
5 Empirical Results
In this section we discuss the econometric results as they relate to the theoretical proposi-
tions. We focus on the random e⁄ects models because they allow identi￿cation of all para-
meters of interest and, when comparisons are possible, generate results that are very similar
to those for the ￿xed e⁄ects models. The Full Sample, Natural Experiment, and Before
Program models are referred to hereafter as the FS, NE, and BP models, respectively.
Voluntary Restraint. Proposition 1 predicts that conservationists will consume less con-
ventional electricity than nonconservationists. The estimate of ^ ’ in the FS model supports
this prediction; it is negative and statistically signi￿cant, indicating that households with
membership in an environmental organization (conservationists) consume less conventional
electricity. The magnitude of this di⁄erence is -1.591 kWh/day on average, which is a 9-
percent reduction from the predicted level of average household consumption. With the
FS model, therefore, we ￿nd evidence of substantial voluntary restraint: controlling for ob-
served and unobserved heterogeneity, conservationists consume an average of 9 percent less
conventional electricity than nonconservationists.
The same result does not emerge in the NE model. While the estimate of ^ ’ is negative, it
is not statistically di⁄erent from zero. One reason for the di⁄erence may be the fact that elec-
tricity demand for participants and waitlisters is very close to the threshold (of 16 kWh/day)
between the ￿rst and second block rates, whereas this is not the case for nonparticipants (see
Table 1). This reduces the predicted level of average household consumption from approxi-
mately 17.8 kWh/day in the FS model to approximately 16.3 kWh/day in the NE model. In
such cases￿ where demand is clustered at the threshold between block rates￿ we have shown
previously that the theory does not predict di⁄erences in consumption between conserva-
19In this case, comparisons between the random and ￿xed e⁄ects estimators are limited because so few
parameters can be identi￿ed with ￿xed e⁄ects. We nevertheless report both sets of results in the interest of
completeness.
22Table 3: Random e⁄ects models of household electricity consumption
(FS) (NE) (BP)
Full Sample Natural Experiment Before Program
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
EnvtOrg (^ ’)y -1.591 (0.852)￿￿ -0.236 (1.162) -1.739 (0.971)￿￿
[0.715]￿￿ [1.101] [0.713]￿￿
GrnRate (^ ￿)y -0.701 (0.208)￿￿￿ -1.541 (0.192)￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
[0.518]￿ [0.549]￿￿￿ ￿
EnvtOrg￿GrnRate (^ ￿)y 0.560 (0.293)￿￿ 0.623 (0.217)￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
[0.787] [0.698] ￿
Senior -0.336 (0.337) -0.427 (0.563) -0.771 (1.168)
[0.504] [0.963] [0.701]
WtrHeat -0.764 (0.567) 5.288 (3.307) 0.197 (1.528)
[2.201] [2.340]￿￿ [0.953]
SpcHeat 6.497 (0.429)￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 5.510 (0.916)￿￿￿
[4.394] ￿ [6.744]
Income 0.051 (0.012)￿￿￿ 0.034 (0.020)￿ 0.042 (0.014)￿￿￿
[0.014]￿￿￿ [0.020]￿ [0.016]￿￿￿
FamSize 1.181 (0.173)￿￿￿ 2.037 (0.217)￿￿￿ 1.711 (0.310)￿￿￿
[0.564]￿￿ [0.842]￿￿ [0.513]￿￿￿
Own 2.418 (1.541) 0.496 (3.612) 2.584 (1.864)
[1.122]￿￿ [3.268] [1.358]￿
AptCondo -4.302 (1.342)￿￿￿ -5.908 (2.148)￿￿￿ -3.846 (1.569)￿￿
[0.957]￿￿￿ [1.479]￿￿￿ [1.064]￿￿￿
MobHome -1.909 (2.299) 5.132 (4.532) -0.588 (2.611)
[1.720] [39.16] [2.421]
Age -0.019 (0.026) 0.062 (0.043) 0.022 (0.036)
[0.032] [0.083] [0.024]
Gender 1.332 (0.709)￿ -1.743 (1.255) 1.521 (0.808)￿
[0.564]￿￿ [1.214] [0.641]￿￿
Education 0.154 (0.143) 0.186 (0.233) 0.148 (0.163)
[0.117] [0.212] [0.114]
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 59,731 11,875 16,072
Households 637 127 596
Predicted kWhDayit 17.755 16.257 17.996
Notes: The dependent variable is average daily electricity consumption by month, kWhDayit.
Conventional standard errors are in parentheses; block bootstrap standard errors are in brackets.
House is the omitted category with respect to AptCondo and MobHome. Missing data for all
survey variables other than EnvtOrg were ￿lled with the means corresponding to the household￿ s
status as a participant, waitlister, or nonparticipant. The y indicates signi￿cance level based on
a one-tailed test. One, two, or three asterisks indicate signi￿cance at the levels p<0.10, p<0.05,
or p<0.01, respectively.
23tionists and nonconservationists. Other possible reasons for the insigni￿cance of voluntary
restraint in the NE model include the facts that the number of observations is substantially
lower, and that there is less variation in EnvtOrgi when nonparticipants are excluded. For
all of these reasons, we argue that the NE model does not generate the most reliable estimate
of voluntary restraint.
The BP model provides a better alternative to compare with the FS model. While the
panels in the BP model are limited to observations prior to June 1996, there is greater cross-
sectional variation, as participants, waitlisters, and nonparticipants are all included. The
estimate of ^ ’ in the BP model is -1.739, and it is statistically di⁄erent from zero, suggesting
again that conservationists consume less conventional electricity than nonconservationists.
The di⁄erence is an average of 1.739 kWh/day, which translates into a 9.6-percent reduction
from the model￿ s predicted level of average household consumption. This result is very similar
to that for the FS model and thereby provides further evidence of substantial voluntary
restraint.
Nonconservationists. The ￿rst part of Proposition 2 shows that nonconservationists will
participate in the Green Rate program only if they derive a su¢ ciently large lump-sum ben-
e￿t. The fact that many households without membership in an environmental organization
actually participated is suggestive of this bene￿t. The second part of Proposition 2 enables
a more sophisticated test, however. The prediction is that participating nonconservation-
ists will reduce their electricity consumption, and the magnitude of their reduction will be
as if there had been an increase in the price of conventional electricity equal to the green-
electricity premium. The estimates of ^ ￿ test this prediction. In both the FS and NE models,
^ ￿ is negative and statistically signi￿cant, indicating that participating nonconservationists
do in fact reduce their electricity consumption. The average magnitude of this reduction is
0.701 and 1.541 kWh/day, or 3.9 and 9.5 percent from the predicted means, for the FS and
NE models, respectively.
But how do these estimates for reduced electricity consumption compare to what would
have occurred with only an increase in the price of conventional electricity equal to the
premium of 1.58c //kWh? To answer this question, we derive price elasticities based on the
24voluntary premium and compare them to previously published estimates of the price elastic-
ity for conventional electricity. We calculate the elasticities using the percentage change in
the average price. This approach provides a straightforward way to account for the block-rate
pricing and is consistent with much of the literature on estimating electricity demand.20 Our
estimates of the voluntary-price elasticity are -0.16 for the FS model and -0.38 for the NE
model. The higher estimate for the NE model re￿ ects the fact that participants and wait-
listers consume less electricity on average, yet the estimate for ^ ￿ is larger, thereby resulting
in a larger percentage change in consumption.
It turns out that both estimates of the voluntary-price elasticity are well within the range
of the price elasticities for conventional electricity that are reported in the literature, which
generally fall between -0.1 and -0.7 (for reviews see Bohi and Zimmerman, 1984, and Berndt,
1991). We therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that participating nonconservationists re-
spond as if there had only been an increase in the price of conventional electricity. Recall
that, in the context of the theoretical model, this result implies that participation is moti-
vated by a lump-sum bene￿t, due possibly to the social and psychological bene￿ts described
earlier.
Conservationists. What happens to the electricity consumption of participating conser-
vationists? The ￿rst part of Proposition 3 identi￿es the possibility for an increase, a decrease,
or no change in electricity consumption. Here the econometric results provide evidence of
no change in consumption. The average change in consumption for a participating conserva-
tionist is given by the linear combination of ￿+￿ in speci￿cation (3). Estimates of this linear
combination are -0.141 and -0.918 kWh/day for the FS and NE models, respectively. While
both estimates of the linear combination are negative, neither is statistically di⁄erent from
zero.21 Thus, conservationists￿ who were already exhibiting voluntary restraint￿ exhibit no
statistically signi￿cant change in consumption after participating in the Green Rate pro-
gram. In other words, participation has an insigni￿cant e⁄ect on conservationists￿demand
for electricity. In the context of the theoretical model, this implies that the price premium
20See Bohi and Zimmerman (1984) for a discussion and literature review.
21A Wald test, using either set of standard errors, fails to reject the null hypothesis that ^ ￿+^ ￿ = 0 in both
the FS and NE models.
25for green electricity is approximately equal to the subjective externality that conservation-
ists were voluntarily internalizing with conventional electricity. The result may also re￿ ect
greater inelasticity of demand for conservationists, as they are already exhibiting voluntary
restraint.
Conservationists versus nonconservationists. Proposition 4 makes two predictions about
the relationship between conservationists and nonconservationists. The ￿rst prediction is
that participating conservationists will reduce their electricity consumption by (weakly) less
than participating nonconservationists. This prediction implies a positive coe¢ cient ^ ￿ on the
interaction term EnvtOrg￿GrnRate. In both the FS and NE models, the coe¢ cient is posi-
tive and approximately equal to 0.6. While both estimates are statistically signi￿cant with
the conventional standard errors, accounting for serial correlation with the block bootstrap
standard errors renders them both statistically insigni￿cant.
The second prediction of Proposition 4 is that, after controlling for other factors, conser-
vationists and nonconservationists who participate in the Green Rate program will consume
the same amount of green electricity. We test this prediction with the hypothesis that
^ ’ + ^ ￿ = 0. Estimates of this linear combination are -1.031 and 0.387 kWh/day for FS and
NE models, yet Wald tests reveal that neither estimate is statistically di⁄erent from zero.
Thus, the two types of households are indistinguishable with respect to green-electricity con-
sumption. According to the theoretical model, this similarity occurs because conservationists
have no reason to voluntarily restrain their consumption of green electricity, as it generates
no pollution.
Other determinants of electricity consumption. The remaining coe¢ cients in Table 3
provide information about other factors that in￿ uence electricity consumption. Among the
adjustments to the basic-rate schedule, there is evidence that electric heating a⁄ects con-
sumption in the expected way. Based on the FS and BP models, the coe¢ cient on SpcHeat
is positive, indicating that households use more electricity in the months when heating is
required. This e⁄ect is not statistically signi￿cant, however, after accounting for serial cor-
relation. Households with higher income consume signi￿cantly more electricity, and the
26implied income elasticities are 0.16, 0.13, and 0.13 in the FS, NE, and BP models.22 The
number of family members living in the household has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on
electricity consumption. Electricity consumption is signi￿cantly lower in apartments and
condominiums compared to houses; whereas, mobile homes are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from houses. Home ownership does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on electricity consumption,
nor do the sociodemographic characteristics of age and education. Gender does have a sig-
ni￿cant e⁄ect in the FS and BP models, and the positive coe¢ cient indicates that a female
name on billing statements is associated with lower electricity consumption. Although not
reported, the year dummies exhibit no general trend, while the month dummies indicate
more electricity consumption during the winter months. This latter result is to be expected
in places like Traverse City, where the number of daylight hours is substantially lower in the
winter, and air-conditioning is not common in the summer.
6 Summary and Conclusion
This paper investigates the way in which concern for the environment translates into pre-
dictable patterns of household behavior. Three questions provide the focus of analysis: Do
preferences for environmental quality result in the voluntary restraint of consumption? What
explains willingness to pay a premium for environmentally friendly goods and services? And
what is the relationship between such voluntary restraint and voluntary price premiums? To
answer these questions, we develop a theoretical model of conservation behavior and test its
predictions in an empirical study of household electricity consumption with introduction of
a voluntary green-electricity program.
The theoretical model starts with the distinction between conservationists and noncon-
servationists. Only conservationists care about environmental quality in a way that promotes
concern about the e⁄ects of their consumption decisions on the environment. This concern￿
motivated perhaps by guilt alone￿ translates into the voluntary restraint of consumption;
that is, conservationists consume lower quantities of pollution-generating goods and ser-
22These elasticity estimates are well within the range of income elasticities reported in the literature for
electricity demand (for reviews see Bohi and Zimmerman, 1984, and Berndt, 1991).
27vices, such as conventional electricity. While voluntary restraint is conservation based on
the choice of quantities, the model also considers conservation based on the choice of prices.
When the opportunities are available, the desire to avoid generating pollution may trans-
late into payment of a voluntary premium for substitute goods and services that are more
environmentally friendly, such as green electricity.
An additional feature of the model is that willingness to pay a voluntary price premium is
motivated by more than just the desire to reduce pollution. Social and psychological bene￿ts
also play a role. These bene￿ts may be related to social approval, prestige, and warm glow￿
the same motives that have been shown to motivate private provision of public goods. For
both conservationists and nonconservationists, these potential motives are captured with
a lump-sum bene￿t that arises from paying a voluntary price premium. According to the
model, therefore, both conservationists and nonconservationists may be willing to pay a
voluntary price premium, whereas only conservationists exhibit voluntary restraint.
The empirical portion of the paper analyzes household electricity demand before and
after introduction of a green-electricity program. The analysis takes advantage of original
survey data and utility data to estimate di⁄erences in electricity consumption between con-
servationists and nonconservationists, before and after participation in the green-electricity
program. Furthermore, the empirical setting provides a unique natural experiment in which
program participants are compared to a control group of households on the program￿ s waiting
list.
The econometric results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. There is evi-
dence of substantial voluntary restraint, as conservationists consume almost 10 percent less
conventional electricity than nonconservationists. Conservationists are also more likely to
participate in the green-electricity program. Other results are based on changes in electricity
consumption after paying the voluntary price premium for green electricity. Nonconserva-
tionists are found to reduce their consumption after participating in the program. In partic-
ular, they reduce consumption as if there had been an increase in the price of conventional
electricity equal to the premium for green electricity. In the context of the model, this result
is consistent with the existence of social and psychological bene￿ts of the green-electricity
28program that are unrelated to electricity consumption. In contrast, conservationists, who
were already exhibiting voluntary restraint, do not reduce their electricity consumption af-
ter paying the price premium for green electricity. This result is consistent with the price
premium for green electricity being approximately equal to the subjective externality that
conservationists were voluntarily internalizing with conventional electricity. Finally, there is
evidence that conservationists and nonconservationists are indistinguishable with respect to
consumption of green electricity. The theory underlying this result is that voluntary restraint
does not apply to environmentally friendly goods and services.
To conclude, the theoretical analysis provides new insight into the economics of voluntary
conservation. While the primary focus of environmental economics has been the design of
policy instruments to induce internalization of environmental externalities, this paper exam-
ines the extent to which consumers internalize their externalities voluntarily. Understanding
behavior of this type is important, as it opens the door to consideration of the potential ways
in which voluntary conservation can serve as a complement or substitute for more centralized
forms of energy and environmental policy. The theoretical model generates a series of novel
predictions about the relationship between voluntary restraint and voluntary price premi-
ums. We ￿nd empirical support for all of the theoretical predictions. Future research should
investigate whether these ￿ndings are robust to consumption of di⁄erent goods and services.
Opportunities for such research are increasingly available, as markets for environmentally
friendly goods and services continue to expand.
29Appendix Table: Fixed e⁄ects models of household electricity consumption
(FS) (NE) (BP)
Full Sample Natural Experiment Before Program
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
EnvtOrg (^ ’)y ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
GrnRate (^ ￿)y -0.610 (0.210)￿￿￿ -1.519 (0.193)￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
[0.518] [0.615]￿￿ ￿
EnvtOrg￿GrnRate (^ ￿)y 0.494 (0.296)￿￿ 0.609 (0.218)￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
[0.750] [0.785] ￿
Senior -0.286 (0.356) -0.693 (0.587) ￿ ￿
[0.515] [0.927] ￿
WtrHeat -1.024 (0.620)￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
[2.814] ￿ ￿
SpcHeat 6.369 (0.430)￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 5.264 (0.927)￿￿￿
[4.530] ￿ [7.048]
Income ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
FamSize 0.768 (0.207)￿￿￿ 1.947 (0.233)￿￿￿ 1.781 (0.623)￿￿￿
[0.659] [0.963]￿￿ [1.356]
Own ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
AptCondo ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
MobHome ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
Age 0.057 (0.120) 0.045 (0.138) -0.174 (0.678)
[0.293] [0.517] [0.530]
Gender ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
Education ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 597,31 11,875 16,072
Households 637 127 596
Notes: The dependent variable is average daily electricity consumption by month, kWhDayit.
Conventional standard errors are in parentheses; block bootstrap standard errors are in brackets.
House is the omitted category with respect to AptCondo and MobHome. Missing data for all
survey variables other than EnvtOrg were ￿lled with the means corresponding to the household￿ s
status as a participant, waitlister, or nonparticipant. The y indicates signi￿cance level based on
a one-tailed test. One, two, or three asterisks indicate signi￿cance at the levels p<0.10, p<0.05,
or p<0.01, respectively.
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